Antitrust Law and Proof of Consumer Injury by Joffe, Robert D.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 75 
Number 4 Volume 75, Fall 2001, Number 4 Article 4 
March 2012 
Antitrust Law and Proof of Consumer Injury 
Robert D. Joffe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Joffe, Robert D. (2001) "Antitrust Law and Proof of Consumer Injury," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 75 : No. 4 
, Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol75/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ANTITRUST LAW AND PROOF OF
CONSUMER INJURY
ROBERT D. JOFFEt
INTRODUCTION
The antitrust laws are intended to protect the n'arket system
by preserving competition.' The two principal antitrust laws are
sections one and two of the Sherman Act. Section one is directed
against restraints of trade.2 Although section one stipulates that
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce... is declared to be
illegal,"3 it is evident that this law cannot be read literally.
Contract law, "that body of law that establishes the enforceability
of commercial agreements and enables competitive markets-
indeed, a competitive economy-to function effectively," would be
outlawed if courts read section one literally.4 The statute has
been interpreted to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of
trade.5
t Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore. I would like to thank my colleague and
our associate, Kenneth T. Murata, for his significant contributions to this
Article.
1 See United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1990).
2 Section one of the Sherman Act was complemented by section seven of the
Clayton Act in 1914. Concerned about the Supreme Court's permissive stance
towards mergers, Congress enacted the Clayton Act to prevent mergers between
competing firms that lessened competition. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY
L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 271-
72 (1994). Section seven of the Clayton Act was amended in 1950 to proscribe
any purchases of stock or assets by any person where "the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). Although the legislative history of the statute
includes a number of noneconomic goals such as the protection of small
businesses and the preservation of local control, the economic effect of a decrease
in competition has been the concern that has guided the application of this
statute. See 4 PHmLLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAw I 903b (1998).
3 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
4 See Natl Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
5 See 7 PHILIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, 1501 (1986).
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Section two is directed against monopolization, actual or
attempted.6 Although the language in the Sherman Act is
amenable to a number of interpretations, courts have narrowed
the meaning of these statutes considerably. The discussion that
follows will demonstrate that two principles guide the courts'
application of these laws. First, the objective of the antitrust laws
is the prevention of injury to consumers. Second, the antitrust
laws are intended to protect competition, not competitors.
Requiring some evidence of consumer injury ensures that the
antitrust laws are applied in a fashion that is directly consistent
with the fundamental objectives.
The consumer injury requirement can be understood as an
element to be proved before liability can be found under the
antitrust laws. This requirement serves two purposes in addition
to the protection of consumers from truly anticompetitive
practices. First, the requirement facilitates the expeditious
resolution of legal disputes. Second, the requirement establishes
clearer guidelines for businesses that are wary of running afoul of
the antitrust laws. These effects are particularly important
because of the threat of lawsuits by competitors. The Clayton Act
permits private plaintiffs to seek monetary and injunctive relief
for violations of the antitrust laws. Under section four, any
person who has been injured in his business or property by
"anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" may recover "threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."7 Section sixteen of the Clayton Act
provides that "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall
be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief... against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws.... "8
Permissive legal standards, which prevent courts from
screening out frivolous lawsuits, give rise to conduct and legal
rulings that subvert the purpose of the antitrust laws. Requiring
proof of injury to consumers furthers the objectives of the
antitrust laws by facilitating the dismissal of meritless claims at
an earlier stage in the course of legal proceedings.
One can argue that the government should not be required to
prove injury to consumers because the anticompetitive motive
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
7 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
8 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1994).
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that is often present in actions brought by private plaintiffs is
absent in actions initiated by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). This position
overlooks the costs of uncertainty that would be created if the
requirements for finding liability under' the antitrust law
depended upon the identity of the party filing suit. A consumer
injury requirement provides a clearer benchmark that can be used
by decision makers to determine whether a business decision is
legal or illegal under the antitrust laws. The existence of a
recognized standard for conduct reduces costs associated with
uncertainty. More certain knowledge that conduct that injures
consumers is illegal under the antitrust laws enables firms to
develop business strategies with greater confidence.
The following discussion will explore the effect that making
more explicit a consumer injury requirement would have on
antitrust law, as well as methods for implementing a consumer
injury requirement.
EFFECTS OF A CONSUMER INJURY REQUIREMENT
A consumer injury requirement should become a more explicit
part of the elements that must be proved by plaintiffs in cases
arising under the antitrust laws.
A. Claims Arising Under the Sherman Act, Section One
The two major analytical frameworks for examining the
legality of horizontal agreements are the per se rule and the rule
of reason.9 The application of the per se rule is guided by an
empirical assessment of the effect of the restraint in question on
9 A third mode of analysis known as the "quick look" has also been used by
courts. The "quick look" rule of reason is applied in situations where "an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets." Cal. Dental Ass'n. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). In
cases where the restraint can be characterized in this manner, a defendant may
have an opportunity to offer a procompetitive justification for the challenged
restraint. If a legitimate justification is demonstrated, analysis proceeds under
the rule of reason. If the defendant fails to provide a legitimate procompetitive
justification, the challenged measure is invalidated under the per se rule. See
James A. Keyte, What It Is and How It Is Being Applied: The "Quick Look" Rule
of Reason, 11 ANTITRUST 21 (1997); see also United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d
658, 669 (1993) (discussing application of the "quick look" rule of reason).
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economic efficiency.10  Courts routinely condemn "naked"
restraints that have the sole purpose of restricting competition
and reducing output because their deleterious effect can be
predicted with near certainty." In essence, under the per se rule,
the anticompetitive effects, including those on consumers, are
presumed, because practices, such as price fixing, are universally
thought to be without the possibility of redeeming virtue.
The rule of reason is the residual category that is used to
assess the legality of restraints which are not proscribed under
the per se rule. In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,12 the
Supreme Court set forth the principles that would guide judicial
inquiry under the rule of reason. The Court stated "The true test
of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it
is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."13 This test
has been given greater definition in recent years. Inquiry under
the rule of reason typically asks whether "the challenged restraint
has a substantially adverse effect on competition [and] ...
whether the procompetitive virtues of the alleged wrongful
conduct justifies the otherwise anticompetitive impacts."14 Stated
otherwise, the rule of reason requires courts to consider the
efficiency implications of horizontal agreements by exaining
their effect on competition. A plaintiff can establish
anticompetitive effect through proof of increased prices, reduced
output, or decreased quality.15
The Supreme Court has indicated that the Sherman Act is
based on the legislature's belief that competition yields desirable
economic outcomes. 16 Restraints such as agreements to fix prices
10 See Natl Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 100 (1984) ("[A] per se rule is applied when the practice facially appears
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and
decrease output.'") (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979)).
11 See id. at 109-10.
12 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
13 Id. at 238.
14 Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017 (10th Cir.
1998).
15 See, e.g., Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways, PLC., 257 F.3d 256,
264 (2d Cir. 2001).
16 "The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating
resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality,
service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably
affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers." Natl Soc'y of
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or rig bids are deemed undesirable from a societal viewpoint
because they reduce the level of competition in the economy.1 7
The emphasis on efficiency in the Supreme Court's treatment
of claims arising under section one is evident in opinions such as
Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS18 Consider the Court's discussion of
the appropriate scope of per se rules in Broadcast Music.
[I]n characterizing.., conduct under the per se rule, our
inquiry must focus on whether the effect and, here because
it tends to show effect.... the purpose of the practice [is] to
threaten the proper operation of our predominantly free-
market economy-that is, whether the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend
to restrict competition and decrease output, and in what
portion of the market, or instead one designed to "increase
economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than
less, competitive".' 9
The Court appears to identify protection of competition and
promotion of efficiency as the two objectives of antitrust law.
The dispute in Broadcast Music revolved around a blanket
license issued by a group of corporations consisting of owners of
performance rights to musical compositions. 20 The blanket license
permitted the licensee to play any composition in Broadcast Music
Incorporated's (BMI) collection.2' This practice was challenged
under section one of the Sherman Act as an unlawful restraint of
trade.22  The Court ruled that the practice would not be
condemned under the per se prohibition against price fixing
because of the efficiency implications of the arrangement
developed by BMI.23 Although the blanket license had the effect
of restraining price competition, the arrangement generated
Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,695 (1978).
17 See Dennis 0. Doherty, Note, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp.: Monsanto's Progeny and the Congressional Proposal to Codify the Per Se
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 963, 988-1000 (1989)
(discussing price fixing reducing competition); James T. Halverson, An Overview
of Legal and Economic Issues and the Relevance of the Vertical Merger
Guidelines, 52 ANTITRUST L.J 49, 64-66 (1983) (discussing price fixing resulting
in reduction of interband and intraband competition).
18 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
19 Id. at 19-20 (citations and footnotes omitted).
20 See id. at 5-6.
21 See id. at 5.
22 Id. at 6.
23 See id. at 19-24.
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significant efficiencies. Hovenkamp succinctly summarizes the
efficiencies generated by the arrangement as follows:
The blanket license arrangement saved untold millions of
dollars in transactions costs. Few radio stations could
afford to negotiate individually for the right to perform
every piece of music they played on the air. If they did,
advertising costs would soar and the amount of music
played would drop .... Furthermore, the "shelf life" of
many popular songs is rather short. The performance right
might become worthless while the station was negotiating
for the right to play it.24
The challenged measure escaped invalidation under the per
se prohibition against price fixing because it promoted
competition and increased efficiency. The Court went so far as to
suggest that the substantial reduction in costs differentiated the
blanket license from individual use licenses. 25 Consumers of
music were benefited by a new good-the blanket license.26 The
decrease in transaction costs made possible by the blanket license
increased the "consumption" of music by listeners.
The case, however, demonstrates the problem with focusing
only on the "effect on competition." The blanket license clearly
reduces competition. Only by focusing on the effect on consumers
of music while also taking into account efficiencies do you reach
the result reached by the Supreme Court and find the
arrangements lawful.
Subseqiient opinions have been premised on a similar
analysis of injury to competition, i.e. one where there is, after
taking into account efficiencies, an impact on consumers.
California Dental Ass'n v. FTC2 7 has added a great deal of
definition to the nature of the injury that must be proved to
establish a successful claim under section one. In California
Dental a nonprofit professional association of dentists sought
judicial review of a VTC cease and desist 'order directed at
24 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLIcY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 193 (1994).
25 Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 21-22.
26 This interpretation of the Court's discussion has been adopted by lower
courts. See, e.g., United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, 974 F.2d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir.
1992) (noting that the Broad. Music case describes an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available
at all).
27 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
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advertising restrictions that had been adopted by the California
Dental Association (CDA).28 In a proceeding initiated by the FTC,
an administrative law judge had found that restrictions on certain
forms of advertisement were an unlawful restraint of trade.29 The
Supreme Court was critical of the lower court's analysis of the
challenged restraint. The Court indicated that the examination of
the restraint should have proceeded under the following terms:
"The question is not whether the universe of possible
advertisements has been limited (as assuredly it has), but
whether the limitation on advertisements obviously tends to limit
the total delivery of dental services."30 The opinion directs courts
to treat higher prices or reduced supply as indicia of
anticompetitive effect.31 These are the hallmarks of consumer
injury. Indeed, the Court suggests the test is whether "the
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on
customers and markets."3 2
In disputes arising under section one, the consumer injury
requirement forces courts to determine whether restraints on
commerce are conducive to the welfare of consumers, i.e., whether
they are reasonable. The test ensures that output and pricing
decisions are made autonomously by economic entities unless the
efficiency implications of coordination clearly favor consumers, as
in the case of Broadcast Music
B. Claims Arising Under the Sherman Act, Section Two
A consumer injury requirement is particularly important in
claims arising under section two of the Sherman Act. The offense
of monopolization contains two elements: "(1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the wilful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident."33 Efforts to add definition
to this second element of the offense have proven to be
challenging for courts, litigants, and commentators alike because
2 Id. at 761-62.
2 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 724-25 (9th Cir. 1997).
30 Id. at 776.
31 See id. at 777; see also Gen. Leaseways, Inc., v. Natl Truck Leasing Ass'n,
744 F.2d 588, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1984) (asserting that raising prices, reducing
supply, and dividing markets all have the same anti-competitive effect).
32 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770 (emphasis added).
33 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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the conduct which gives rise to monopolization claims is often
similar to conduct that is widely regarded as procompetitive. 34
Mistaken condemnation of procompetitive conduct threatens to
chill conduct in the marketplace that is conducive to the
attainment of efficient results. The challenge facing courts,
commentators, and practitioners is promulgating legal standards
that will enable adjudicators to reliably differentiate between
these two types of conduct. Judge Posner's description of the
conduct of those in business provides a useful point of departure:
Most businessmen don't like their competitors, or for that
matter competition. They want to make as much money as
possible and getting a monopoly is one way of making a lot
of money. That is fine, however, so long as they do not use
methods calculated to make consumers worse off in the long
run.35
This conception of the permissible bounds of conduct for
businesses is compatible with our current understanding of the
purposes of antitrust law-the promotion of efficiency. Courts
have repeatedly reminded litigants that the antitrust laws are not
intended to deal with conduct that is merely amenable to
characterizations such as "unfair" or "predatory."36
Similar principles have guided the development of antitrust
standing law. In order to assert a private cause of action under
section four of the Clayton Act, plaintiffs must demonstrate
antitrust injury.37 The Supreme Court has defined antitrust
injury as "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
34 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 488
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern
to the antitrust laws-or that might even be viewed as procompetitive-can take
on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monopolist.").
35 Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th
Cir. 1986).
36 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 225 (1993). The Brooke Group court stated:
Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another
does not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws;
those laws do not create a federal law of unfair competition or
"purport to afford remedies for all torts committed by or against
persons engaged in interstate commerce."
Id. (quoting Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945)).
37 Section four of the Clayton Act provides a private cause of action to any
person who has been injured by "anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 15
U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
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unlawful."38 At least one court has ruled that in order to satisfy
this requirement, a private plaintiff must demonstrate that its
loss is attributable to conduct which raises price or reduces output
for consumers.3 9 Although a discussion of the antitrust injury
requirement would fall beyond the scope of this paper, it is useful
to recognize the pervasiveness of the belief that actions brought
pursuant to the antitrust laws should have the effect of promoting
its objectives.
It has been suggested that a requirement that plaintiffs
submit proof of consumer injury in the form of circumstances such
as higher prices or reduced output suffers from a logical flaw.40 If
an incumbent monopolist engages in anticompetitive practices in
defense of its monopoly, there will be no change in prices if it
succeeds-monopoly prices will simply persist.41 This criticism
misconstrues the nature of the inquiry demanded by the
consumer injury requirement. When a section two action is
initiated against an incumbent firm for conduct that is intended
to preserve monopoly power, some connection must be found
between the exclusionary act and the welfare of consumers.
Courts must ask how consumers have been made worse off by the
challenged practice. Predatory pricing, if it prevents entry or
lower long run pricing would result in consumer injury and be
illegal. There is no logical flaw in employing the test.
The notion of consumer injury has been an implicit part of the
Supreme Court's treatment of claims arising under section two.
The requirement ensures that only practices that are inimical to
the welfare of consumers are condemned.42  The relationship
between consumer injury and two causes of action will be
examined in turn: (1) predatory pricing and (2) exclusionary
conduct.
38 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
39 See Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 961 F.2d 667,
670 (7th Cir. 1992).
40 See David A. Balto & Ernest A. Nagata, Proof of Competitive Effects in
Monopolization Cases: A Response to Professor Muis, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 309,
311-12 (2000).
41 See id. at 312.
42 Others have also noted the need to explicate a connection between conduct
and anticompetitive effect See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The FTC and the Law of
Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 693, 696-97 (2000).
20011
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1. Predatory Pricing
A predatory pricing claim consists of two elements. First, the
plaintiff must prove that a rival has set its price below cost.
4 3
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that "the competitor had a
reasonable prospect, or, under section 2 of the Sherman Act, a
dangerous probability of recouping its investment in below-cost
prices."44 To satisfy this element, evidence must be adduced to
demonstrate either that the alleged predator has recouped its
investment through the elevation of price or that recoupment is
likely.45 The second element ensures that conduct that benefits
consumers is not condemned under the antitrust laws. If there is
no recoupment of the "investment" in lower prices in the form of
monopoly or supracompetitive rents in the time period following
successful predation, consumers are benefit by the lower prices
that existed during the period of aggressive pricing.46 The
Supreme Court has adopted this line of reasoning in recent
opinions. In Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tabacco
Corp. , the Court observed that "[a]lthough unsuccessful
predatory pricing may encourage some inefficient substitution
toward the product being sold at less than its cost, unsuccessful
predation is in general a boon to consumers." 47
The stringency of the current standard reflects the skepticism
of the judiciary about the plausibility of predatory pricing.
Influenced to no small extent by the scholarship of the Chicago
School of antitrust analysis, the Supreme Court's current
skepticism is based on an empirical assessment of the frequency
of predatory pricing.48 The Court has treated predatory pricing as
43 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 222-25 (1993).
44 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224 (citations omitted).
45 The requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that recoupment has
occurred or is likely should be distinguished from a requirement that the
plaintiff demonstrate present harm to consumers. Conceptually, the two
requirements are distinct. A present harm requirement would prevent plaintiffs
from asserting claims under section two until monopolization was successful and
actual injury was suffered by consumers. See FRANKLIN M. FISHER & DANIEL L.
RUBINFELD, Misconceptions, Misdirections, and Mistakes, in DID MICROSOFT
HARM CONsUMERs?: Two OPPOSING ViEws 87, 88 (2000), available at http://www.
aei-brookings.org/publications/books/consumers.pdf. I am not arguing for such a
test. Likely harm is sufficient.
46 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224.
47 Id.
48 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589-
90 (1986).
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an uncommon practice-one that is "rarely tried, and even more
rarely successful."49
This position has been challenged in recent years as antitrust
scholars have embraced the scholarship of economists who have
developed models that suggest that predatory pricing is a rational
and plausible strategy.50  For example, economists have
attempted to demonstrate the relationship between a firm's
pricing practices and its reputation among competitors.51 This
new approach suggests that aggressive pricing could be used to
create a reputation for irrationality that will deter other
competitors from entering a market or competing on the basis of
price.52 This reasoning is often applied in the context of a model
with multiple markets.53  The investment in establishing a
reputation for irrationality through below-cost pricing in one or a
few markets is offset by the increased returns in other markets
where competitors have learned about the reputation for
irrational behavior.5 4 Under this model, pricing that is below cost
and unremunerative in a single market may be a part of a
multimarket predatory pricing strategy. Although this claim
might be plausible, it is unclear how this model could be used to
generate a legal standard.55 A court would be hard-pressed to
distinguish between vigorous price competition and predation.
In the absence of a reliable and widely accepted adjudicatory
methodology for distinguishing between these two types of
practices, a legal standard that imposes criminal or civil liability
49 Id. at 589. In Matsushita Elec., the Supreme Court cites with approval the
scholarship of Chicago School commentators such as Robert Bork, Frank
Easterbrook, and John McGee. Id.
5o See Ind. Grocery Co. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 561, 575-76
(S.D. Ind. 1988).
51 See Jonathan B. Baker, Challenges To The Chicago School Approach:
Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge Chicago School Views, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 649 (1989).
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See id. (noting how "rivals" that have not been exposed to predatory
competition may fear that the irrational firms will predate against them).
55 At least one court has acknowledged the plausibility of a predatory pricing
scheme that is effectuated through the development of reputation for aggressive
pricing. See Advo Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, 51 F.3d 1191, 1196 n.4 (3d Cir.
1995). The court used the multiple market scenario to illustrate the plausibility
of predation in a context where a predator needs to make a relatively small
investment to reap large rewards. In Advo the plaintiff failed to adduce facts
sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Id.
20011
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on the basis of injury to the competitive process broadly
understood may prove to be undesirable from a societal
standpoint. Consider the Supreme Court's discussion of the
welfare implications of relaxing the current legal standard for
predatory pricing claims:
[T]he mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory
pricing-lowering prices-is the same mechanism by which
a firm stimulates competition; because "cutting prices in
order to increase business often is the very essence of
competition... [;] mistaken inferences... are especially
costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws
are designed to protect."5 6
The current recoupment requirement ensures that the
predatory pricing claims are resolved in a manner that is
consistent with the objectives of the antitrust laws. In a
successful predation scheme, the injury to consumers arises from
the monopoly that is enjoyed by the predator-prices are
increased, and the quantity of output that is consumed
decreases. 57 For consumers to suffer injury, the losses that are
inflicted by the post-predation behavior of the monopolist must
exceed any gains that accrued to them during the period of low
pricing.5 8 The recoupment requirement ensures that courts will
not condemn bouts of aggressive pricing that occur during a
course of conduct that is, on balance, beneficial to consumers.
2. Exclusionary Conduct
A second type of section two claim that is subject to the rule
of reason analysis arises from practices that are perceived to be
exclusionary. A well-known example of this cause of action is
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.5 9 Aspen Skiing
arose from a dispute between the owners of downhill ski facilities
56 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 n.17 (1986)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
57 See William H. Jordan, Comment, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group:
The Problem of State "Sales Below Cost" Statutes, 44 EMoRY L.J. 267, 289 (1995)
("The injury to... consumers... occurs only when a firm, after having driving
its competitors out of the market, uses its newly acquired market share or
monopoly power to restrict output and raise prices to supracompetitive levels.").
58 See id. ([In order to injure consumers, the prices set by the surviving firm
must not increase merely to a level above that which would prevail in a
competitive market, but the prices must rise to a supracompetitive level for a
time period sufficient to allow the predator firm to recover its investment...
59 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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in Aspen, Colorado. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation
("Highlands") filed a claim under section two alleging that Aspen
Skiing Company ("Skiing Co.") had monopolized the market for
downhill skiing in the area.60 Highlands owned one of four
downhill skiing facilities in the region. Skiing Co. owned the
remaining three facilities. The suit arose from the termination of
a joint venture in which the two firms offered an "All Aspen"
ticket that permitted holders to ski at all four facilities.61 Skiing
Co. withdrew from the joint venture, making it extremely difficult
for Highlands to compete. 62
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's finding that
Skiing Co. had engaged in conduct that violated the Sherman
Act.63 The Supreme Court's decision to affirm rested on two
bases. First, defendant Skiing Co. failed to offer any efficiency
justification for its conduct.64  Second, Skiing Co.'s conduct
injured the plaintiff and consumers. 65 Ample evidence was offered
at trial that demonstrated that consumers preferred the "All
Aspen" package that was eliminated by defendant's challenged
action.66 The Court found that "the evidence supports an inference
that Ski[ing] Co. was not motivated by efficiency concerns and
that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer
goodwill, in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its
smaller rival."67 The finding of liability in Aspen Skiing. appears
to be based on the connection between conduct that is injurious to
competitors and the detrimental effects of such conduct on
consumers. The consumer injury requirement helps to establish
constraints on the types of unilateral conduct that could be
employed by a dominant firm in a market. Making more explicit
a requirement of consumer injury would ensure that only conduct
that is injurious to consumers would be condemned.
A finding of illegality must turn on the nature of the
challenged business practice. 68  If there is no legitimate
60 See id. at 595.
61 See id. at 589-90.
62 Id. at 594-95.
63 Id. at 611.
64 See id. at 608-10.
65 See id. at 610.
66 See id. at 605.
67 Id. at 610-11.
68 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597
(1986) ("[Iun light of the absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither
20011
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procompetitive justification for the practice, a finding of illegality
is appropriate.6 9 This is analogous to the situation in Aspen
Skiing where the challenged practice produced no benefits for
consumers and could not be explained by any rationale aside from
the accretion or maintenance of monopoly power.
If the challenged practice is unprofitable for the incumbent
firm but for future monopoly profits, a finding of illegality is
clearly appropriate.70  This is analogous to the recoupment
requirement in a predatory pricing case. Harm is suffered by
consumers because of the reduction of output, decrease in quality,
and/or increase in price to monopoly levels in the post-predation
period. The success of the practice depends on the achievement of
a result that injures consumers, or the likelihood of such a result.
If the challenged practice would have been implemented by the
incumbent firm for economic or technological reasons regardless
of whether the monopoly would have been preserved, the practice
should not be condemned. In this case, the decision to adopt the
practice would not depend on the achievement of an outcome that
is injurious to consumers. The consumer injury requirement
enables the courts to identify practices that are undesirable from
a societal standpoint with greater accuracy.
petitioners' pricing practices, nor their conduct in the Japanese market, nor their
agreements respecting prices and distribution in the American market, suffice to
create a 'genuine issue for trial.' "); see also Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E.
Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV.
551, 584 (1991) (noting that a plaintiff who alleges the illegality of "adverse price
and output effects" must "establish that its injuries result from those same price
and output effects").
69 See Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect,
1999 BYU L. REv. 1265, 1322-23 (1999) ("If the defendant cannot convince the
judge that its practices are an essential feature of competition.., the judge
prohibits the practice.").
70 See Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 588-89. The Court in Matsushita
Elec. Indus. stated:
Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires
conspirators to forgo profits that free competition would offer them.
The forgone profits may be considered an investment in the future.
For the investment to be rational, the conspirators must have a
reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly
profits, more than the losses suffered.
Id. at 588-89. The Court went on to explain that absent evidence of such an
expectation, the accretion of monopoly power would be found unreasonable. Id.
at 593; see also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 226 (1993) ("Evidence of below-cost pricing is not alone sufficient to
permit an inference of probable recoupment .... ").
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A demonstration of injury to consumers ensures that
desirable competition is not condemned under the antitrust laws;
without more, the mere absence or demise of competitors will not
trigger the application of section two. At least one court has
remarked that the Supreme Court's understanding of antitrust
policy has shifted from "the protection of competition as a process
of rivalry to the protection of competition as a means of promoting
economic efficiency."71 Competition is a process that is protected
because it yields efficient results. The outcome of the competitive
process may be few firms, or even one firm. As one commentator
has noted, under the Supreme Court's current antitrust
jurisprudence, there is "no stigma attached to victory in the
contest for consumers' favor. 1 2
Section two is intended to condemn conduct that lessens
competition and injures consumers through resulting increases in
price or decreases in output or reduction in quality.7 3 The
consumer injury requirement enables courts to distinguish
legitimate claims under section two from the results of vigorous
competition on the merits.
METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING A CONSUMER INJURY REQUIREMENT
The adoption of a more explicit consumer injury requirement
71 Olympia Equip. Leasing Co., ALFCO v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370,
375 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Prods. Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins.
Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1982) ("The consumer does not care how many
sellers of a particular good or service there are; he cares only that there be
enough to assure him a competitive price and quality.").
72 Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization: Past, Present, Future, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 99, 105 (1992).
73 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1993).
"[T]he notion that proof of unfair or predatory conduct alone is sufficient to make
out the offense of attempted monopolization is contrary to the purpose and policy
of the Sherman Act." Id. at 457. "The purpose of the Act is not to protect
businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the
failure of the market." Id. at 458. But see Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIo ST. L.J. 1035, 1036 (2000). Hovenkamp states,
Nothing in the debates of the Sherman Act's framers enlightens us
further. Section 2... created a new federal offense but provided only
the vaguest guidelines as to its meaning or the particular acts that
would constitute a violation. The only thing that seems clear is that
the monopolizing offense refers to someone who acquires or attempts
to acquire all of the business in the market, and that this acquisition
could not be the result of superior skill or industry.
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in cases arising under sections one and two of the Sherman Act
would sharpen the evidentiary requirements for competitive
injury.
The California Dental opinion defined the type of proof that
would be required to assert a viable claim under the antitrust
laws.7 4 The Supreme Court laid a great deal of stress on the need
for plaintiffs to adduce empirical evidence of injury.75 California
Dental reflects wariness of the tendency for courts, commentators
and litigants to supplant factual inquiry with economic theory.
The Court's remarks in California Dental are instructive:
[Blefore a theoretical claim of anticompetitive effects can
justify shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical
evidence of procompetitive effects,.., there must be some
indication that the court making the decision has properly
identified the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive
effects and considered whether the effects actually are
anticompetitive. Where, as here, the circumstances of the
restriction are somewhat complex, assumption alone will
not do.76
This position is consistent with earlier opinions in which the
Court has laid down similar strictures. 77
Courts should require plaintiffs to set forth evidence of
consumer injury in the form of higher prices, reduced output, or
deterioration in the quality of goods and services, in addition to
evidence of anticompetitive conduct that violates the antitrust
laws. Defendants should have an opportunity to rebut plaintiffs'
claims by demonstrating that the perceived consumer injury is
not attributable to the challenged conduct.
A number of commentators have evinced concern that a
heightened evidentiary standard will favor defendants. First,
they argue that the factual inquiry demanded under the rule of
reason is costly.78 Inquiry under the rule of reason that is more
74 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999).
75 See id. at 776.
76 Id. at 775 n.12.
77 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
466-69 (1992); William J. Kolasky, California Dental Association v. FTC: The
New Antitrust Empiricism, 14 ANTITRUST L.J. 68 (1999).
78 Concerns about the costs associated with heightened evidentiary
requirements under the rule of reason have been discussed widely. See, e.g.,
Eugene Crew & Richard Grossman, Antitrust Litigation Reform: A Modest
Proposal, 7 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 41-42 (1993). The costs may also distort the
selection of legal arguments by plaintiffs. See Denny's Marina, Inc. v. Renfro
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fact intensive may reduce the frequency with which antitrust
claims are filed.. A second concern relates to the availability of
empirical data that could be used to establish consumer injury.
Concerns about the difficulty of measuring and proving increases
in price, decreases in supply, or deterioration in the quality of
goods and services have been raised by courts.79
However, critics who raise these objections to the stringent
evidentiary requirements base their claim on an untenable
assumption: the rate at which findings of liability currently take
place more accurately reflects the incidence of antitrust violations
than would be the case under a legal regime that requires explicit
proof of consumer injury. To the extent that the current level of
liability findings is based on antitrust standards that do not
require explicit consideration of consumer injury, it is possible
that instances of beneficial, procompetitive activity are being
condemned.
CONCLUSION
Although economic theory may provide a useful guide for
intuition, it is necessary to ensure that there is correspondence
between the world described by the theorist and the world
inhabited by the business person making business decisions. The
Supreme Court's recent statement in California Dental regarding
the need to base decisions on empirical evidence of
anticompetitive injury underscores the importance of this concern.
An explicit consumer injury requirement will force courts and
litigants to conduct fact-intensive assessments of the effects of
business practices. The task for economists and jurists alike
should be the development of analytical techniques which will
enhance the ability of courts to discern the true indicia of
consumer injury-increases in price, decreases in output, or
reduced product quality attributable to the exercise of market
power that arises from anticompetitive acts.
Prods., Inc. 8 F.3d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that the plaintiff pursued a
legal theory that would trigger the per se rule instead of the rule of reason
because it could not afford the market analysis and expert witnesses required to
prove anticompetitive effect under the latter).
79 See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993). The
Brown Univ. court noted that in light of the fact that "[sluch proof is often
impossible to make ... courts typically allow proof of the defendant's 'market
power' instead." Id.
2001]
632 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.75:615
The concern that actions inimical to the competitive process
will go undetected and unremedied needs to be balanced against
the concern that competition on the merits that injures
competition will be confused with pernicious behavior. "Injury to
competition" is an amorphous concept that may not take into
account efficiencies and other benefits. "Injury to consumers,"
broadly defined, provides a surer test.
